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ABSTRACT Analyzing the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey, this study assesses whether an
elaborate institutional theory is able to explain why levels of welfare chauvinism differ among
welfare regimes. As expected, native populations in liberal and conservative welfare regimes prove
more reluctant to distributing welfare services to immigrants than those in social-democratic ones.
Adding country-level data, it is demonstrated that neither differences in the selectivity nor differ-
ences in employment protection and unemployment levels can explain these varying levels of welfare
chauvinism. Instead, regime differences in welfare chauvinism can be fully attributed to their
differences in income inequality.
Introduction
A common idea among scholars of politics and policy is that extensive and universal welfare
regimes result in a stronger sense of solidarity and more tolerance towards outgroups among
majority populations than do residual ones. Such assertions can already be found in classical
readings on the welfare state byMarshall (1950) and Titmuss (1968), and several studies have
empirically tested these arguments by comparing the opinions of people living in welfare
regimes that differ in the level of generosity and the extent of decommodification. Most of
these comparisons are based on Esping-Andersen’s well-known typology of welfare regimes
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(1990). These by and large expect that social-democratic welfare states result in the highest
levels of solidarity and tolerance among their majority populations, followed by conservative
and liberal ones respectively (cf. Dallinger 2010). Although research along these lines has
produced scattered findings (for overviews, see Jaeger 2006, 2009), a clear pattern is found in
studies focusing on opinions about welfare policies in the “narrow sense” (cf. Larsen 2006,
2008): majority populations in liberal welfare regimes are on average less supportive of
policies directed at the poor and the unemployed than those in conservative regimes, and
especially less than those in social-democratic ones (see e.g. Jaeger 2009).
Such studies seem to fit in an institutional approach to politics, which is informed by
the idea that political preferences and attitudes are shaped by political institutions, whose
endogenous nature is emphasized (March and Olsen 1996). This has been recognized by
Christian Albrekt Larsen (2006, 2008), who concluded that commonly used theories –
“power resource theory”, “new politics theory”, and “culture theory” – proved to be
remarkably impotent for explaining why people in liberal welfare states are least suppor-
tive of welfare directed at the poor and the unemployed. He has therefore formulated and
tested a different, “institutional line of reasoning”, which combines insights from welfare
regime theory as formulated by Marshall (1950) and Titmuss (1968, 1974; cf. Myles and
Quadagno 2002), with theorizing on deservingness criteria (cf. Van Oorschot 2000). The
overall idea is that “the institutional structure of the different welfare regimes influences or
– using another terminology – frames the way the public perceives the poor and the
unemployed” (Larsen 2008: 148). More specifically, Larsen has demonstrated that the
institutional structure of three different welfare regimes affects the extent to which the
public perceives the poor and unemployed as (1) deviant, (2) in need of welfare, and (3) in
control of their own situation. These three “deservingness criteria” in turn influence
whether or not the poor and unemployed are considered to be entitled to welfare.
While this specific branch of institutional theory has already proven its merits when it
comes to explaining views on the poor and the unemployed, it also seems promising when it
comes to opinions on the deservingness of another group holding a minority position,
immigrants. A salient discussion in the literature focuses on immigrants’ entitlements to
welfare arrangements. In all European countries, although to a varying degree, the public at
large considers immigrants less entitled to welfare benefits and services than the native
population (Van Oorschot 2006). Various studies have assessed the antecedents of this
sentiment, which has been aptly summarized by Andersen and Bjørklund as the idea that
“welfare services should be restricted to ‘our own’” (1990: 212). Their label, “welfare
chauvinism”, has become the standard term for the opinion that immigrants are less entitled
to welfare benefits and services than the native population (cf. Van der Waal et al. 2010;
Mewes and Mau 2012; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012; De Koster et al. 2013).1
In the light of Larsen’s formulation of institutional theory, this raises the question of
whether three worlds of welfare chauvinism can be distinguished: are the native popula-
tions of liberal welfare states most reluctant to distribute welfare benefits and services to
immigrants, followed by natives living in conservative welfare states, while those living
under social-democratic regimes are most willing to do so? And, if so, can this pattern be
explained in accordance with the mechanisms addressed in Larsen’s theory? Before we
turn to our empirical analyses, we must first discuss this theory in more detail.
2 J. van der Waal et al.
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An Institutional Theory of Welfare Chauvinism
By and large, the specific branch of institutional theory formulated by Larsen (2006) ranks
liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes on three dimensions. The first
one is the “selectivity dimension”, which indicates the extent to which a welfare regime is
universal. The second dimension indicates the extent to which a welfare regime reduces
market-driven inequalities between “the rich” and “the poor”. While Larsen refers to this
dimension as the “generosity dimension”, we will denote it as the “inequality dimension”
in order to avoid conceptual confusion that could arise from the generosity label, which is
often employed with a different meaning in the literature on welfare arrangements (e.g.
referring to the share of the population that is covered by these, see Scruggs 2004). The
third dimension, “labor-market trajectory”, addresses the extent to which a welfare regime
creates labor-market opportunities for the least skilled. These three dimensions are thought
to affect the three deservingness criteria – deviance, need and control – that guide the
opinions of the majority population concerning whether or not (potential) welfare reci-
pients are entitled to welfare. First we discuss the selectivity and inequality dimensions,
and later we consider the labor-market trajectory dimension.
Before we do so, it should be noted that Larsen’s model is a simplified representation of
a complex reality, just as any theory is. It is, after all, plausible that welfare regimes do not
unidirectionally shape public opinions: public opinions most likely also affect welfare
arrangements. Nevertheless, strong theoretical arguments have been made in favor of the
causal direction implied by Larsen’s model (see Rothstein and Stolle 2008), and recent
research (Raven et al. 2011) demonstrates that the direction of the relationship differs
between policy domains. Public opinion only informs public policies if these are new and
not yet institutionalized, whereas the relationship is reversed in the case of highly
institutionalized welfare arrangements. The latter do affect public opinions, which sup-
ports the assumption underlying the theoretical model under scrutiny.
The Impact of the Selectivity and Inequality Dimensions on the Deviance Criterion
The selectively and inequality dimensions rank welfare regimes in a way that resembles
the classic ideas of Marshall (1950) and Titmuss (1968). On the basis of the selectivity
dimension, welfare regimes are ordered by the extent to which they are characterized by
selective – “means tested” – programmatic structures of benefits and services instead of
universal ones. The inequality dimension ranks welfare regimes by the level of inequality
that results from their programmatic structures. These two dimensions result in the
following order: liberal (most selective; most unequal), conservative (medium selective;
medium unequal), and social-democratic welfare regimes (least selective; least unequal).
Liberal regimes merely provide welfare for the most needy which leads to the highest
levels of inequality between the rich and poor. Social-democratic ones include benefits
and services for large parts of the population and are characterized by the lowest levels of
inequality between the rich and poor. Conservative regimes rank in-between on both
dimensions (Rothstein 1998; Larsen 2006).
The selectivity and inequality dimensions are theorized to influence opinions on the
deservingness of (potential) welfare recipients, because both affect the extent to which
majority populations consider them to be deviant. The underlying mechanisms are,
however, different. In the case of the selectivity dimension, it is important to note that
Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? 3
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“the very act of separating out the needy almost always stamps them as socially inferior,
as ‘others’ with other types of social characteristics and needs” (Rothstein 1998: 158). The
framing implied by selective welfare services thus decreases the extent to which majority
populations perceive welfare recipients as “one of us”. Selective programmatic structures
of benefits and services furthermore draw a sharper and more easily discernible line
between those who benefit from the welfare state and those who do not. As a result,
“the needy” and “the poor” are clearly separated from other citizens in public debates on
welfare, aggravating the us-versus-them divide (cf. Larsen 2007: 87–88). The selectivity
of welfare services consequently makes it harder for majority populations to identify with
the poor and those in need – with “those people” (Rothstein 1998: 157) – and the former
are consequently more likely to consider the latter a “public burden” (Titmuss 1968: 129),
deviant, and therefore undeserving of welfare.
The inequality dimension is also assumed to affect the extent to which majority
populations consider (potential) welfare recipients as deviant. The crucial difference
with the selectivity dimension is, however, that the inequality dimension does not involve
frames embedded in the institutional make-up of welfare regimes. Instead, the explanation
lies in the different outcomes brought about by different welfare regimes. The underlying
idea is that some welfare states mitigate income inequality more strongly than others,
while “reduced differences in economic resources between ‘the majority’ and ‘the bottom’
of society generate more similar living styles, as a consequence making it easier for ‘the
bottom’ to fulfill the identity criterion” (Larsen 2006: 57). Put differently, welfare states
that diminish market-driven inequalities least are most likely to result in strongly articu-
lated social divisions between the rich and poor – resulting in “two nations”, instead of
one (cf. Titmuss 1968: 122). In such welfare states, the rich hardly identify themselves
with the poor, and they are, therefore, more likely to consider the latter deviant, and thus
less entitled to welfare.
Whereas these ideas about the selectivity and the inequality dimensions have originally
been developed with the poor and the unemployed in mind, several research findings suggest
that both dimensions might also be relevant for explaining different levels of welfare
chauvinism. In the first place, studies of opinions related to the rather general question of
whether immigrants should get the same rights as natives or citizens (Mau and Burkhardt
2009) and of views pertaining to the question of whether immigrants take away jobs and are
a burden for the welfare state (Crepaz and Damron 2009) find similar patterns to those
addressing views on the poor and the unemployed. Even though these studies do not focus
on welfare chauvinism,2 and although Mau and Burkhardt (2009) use a typology that differs
from Esping-Andersen’s, their results suggest that native populations in social-democratic
welfare regimes take a more inclusive stance towards immigrants and are less concerned
about “negative” labor-market and welfare effects of immigration than those in liberal ones.
In the second place, the identity criterion that intermediates the impact of the
selectivity and inequality of welfare regimes on the perceived deservingness of the
poor and unemployed – that of deviance – seems to be applicable to immigrants, too (cf.
Larsen 2006: 49). Universal welfare regimes are likely to obstruct the marking out of
immigrants in discussions on welfare, and welfare regimes producing low levels of
income inequality are likely to hamper identifying immigrants as deviant due to poor
living conditions.
The above gives rise to two hypotheses. First, we expect that differences in the extent to
which majority populations living under liberal, conservative and social-democratic
4 J. van der Waal et al.
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welfare regimes consider immigrants to be entitled to welfare services can be explained by
differences in the selectivity of these regimes (hypothesis 1). Second, we expect that such
differences in welfare chauvinism can be explained by differences in inequality among the
populations of these welfare states (hypothesis 2).
The Impact of the Labor-Market Trajectory on the Need and Control Criteria
The labor-market trajectory is the third dimension of welfare regimes that affects the opinion
of the majority about the poor and the unemployed (Larsen 2006) and possibly about
immigrants as well. It is theorized that this dimension relates to the deservingness criteria of
“need” and “control”. More specifically, it influences the extent to which the poor and the
unemployed are thought to be in need of welfare benefits and services and the extent to
which majority populations perceive them to be in control of their own situation.
When it comes to the “need” criterion, it is important that the institutional make-up of
liberal, conservative and social-democratic welfare regimes results in differences in job
opportunities at the bottom of their labor markets (Esping-Andersen 1990). The deregu-
lated liberal welfare regimes have low wage levels and consequently yield high labor
demand for low-skilled service workers in the private sector. Social-democratic welfare
regimes are also characterized by high labor demand for low-skilled service workers,
albeit in the public, instead of the private, sector. Conservative regimes, on the other hand,
do not yield high demand for service workers –in the private or the public sector – as
these are directed at protecting sole-wage-earner families. Referring to Esping-Andersen,
Larsen explains this as follows: “conservative regimes followed a labour reduction route.
It did not boost employment in the service sector, but instead protected the male insider
against the risk of unemployment through strict job protection and early retirement
schemes” (2006: 59). Clearly, then, as compared to conservative welfare regimes, liberal
and social-democratic ones are characterized by more job opportunities at the bottom of
the labor market that enable people to be self-supportive instead of dependent on welfare
benefits and services (see for findings corroborating this suggestion: Raveaud 2007).
Therefore, majority populations in liberal and social-democratic regimes most likely
perceive the unemployed as less in need of welfare services, and consequently as less
entitled to welfare, than majority populations in conservative welfare regimes do.
The second mechanism is not about need, but about the extent to which (potential)
welfare recipients are considered to be in control of their own situation. The basic
argument here is that employment regulation, which substantially decreases the extent
to which jobseekers are likely to be successful, is most strict in social-democratic and
conservative welfare regimes (cf. Lindbeck and Snower 1988). First, working conditions
in social-democratic and conservative welfare regimes are hardly open to negotiation.
Liberal ones, in contrast, facilitate such negotiations and enable the unemployed to reduce
their wage demands. The unemployed in liberal regimes are consequently more in control
of their own situation than those in social-democratic and conservative ones. Second, the
protection of “insiders” on the labor market – i.e. those who already have a steady job – is
strongest in conservative regimes, followed by social-democratic and liberal ones. If
insiders on the labor market are more protected, the unemployed face more difficulties
in finding employment. Hence, the institutional make-up of liberal welfare regimes leaves
the unemployed more in control over their own situation than those in social-democratic
and conservative ones.
Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? 5
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Extending these theoretical arguments to views on the welfare entitlements of immi-
grants, we can formulate two additional hypotheses. We expect that differences in the
extent to which majority populations in liberal, conservative and social-democratic wel-
fare regimes consider immigrants to be entitled to welfare services can be explained by
differences in unemployment levels (hypothesis 3). In addition, we expect that such
differences in welfare chauvinism can be explained by differences in the strictness of
employment protection (hypothesis 4).
Figure 1 summarizes the institutional theory of welfare chauvinism outlined above. On
the left-hand side, it shows that welfare regimes differ on three dimensions: (1) selectivity,
ranging from residual or means-tested to universal; (2) inequality, indicating the level of
income inequality; and (3) labor-market trajectory, indicating the extent to which regimes
offer employment opportunities. For each of these dimensions, the expected rank order of
the three welfare regimes is indicated. The next column displays rank orders on the three
deservingness criteria: (1) deviance, indicating the extent to which majority populations
consider immigrants to be deviant; (2) need, representing the extent to which majority
populations perceive immigrants to be in need of welfare services; and (3) control,
indicating the extent to which those populations perceive immigrants to be in control
over their own employment situation.
Research Format, Data and Operationalization
Our hypotheses will be tested by means of multilevel modeling on a dataset that combines
individual-level data of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008) with country-level data
retrieved from various sources. To our knowledge the ESS 2008 is the only internationally
comparative dataset containing a measure of welfare chauvinism. The country-level data
Figure 1. The institutional theory of welfare chauvinism
Welfare 
regime
Labor-market 
trajectory 
(unemployment and 
strictness employment 
protection)
(1) Conservative
(2) Social-
democratic 
(3) Liberal
Inequality
(1) Social-
democratic 
(2) Conservative
(3) Liberal
Selectivity
(1) Liberal
(2) Conservative
(3) Social-
democratic
Deviance
(1) Liberal
(2) Conservative
(3) Social-
democratic
Need
(1) Conservative 
(2) Social-
democratic
(3) Liberal
Control
(1) Liberal
(2) Social-
democratic
(3) Conservative
Welfare 
chauvinism
Regime dimensions Deservingness criteria
+
—
+
—
+
—
+
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needed for testing our hypotheses could not be retrieved for all countries in the ESS, but
ten countries for which such data are available can be categorized according to Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. Our categorization is in accordance with that of
Larsen (2006: 68) in formulating the institutional theory addressed in this article. In
addition to five social-democratic regimes (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden) and three conservative ones (Belgium, France and Germany),3 there are only
two liberal welfare regimes in the dataset: Ireland and the United Kingdom. Note,
however, that those are the only two liberal welfare regimes in Europe.
Since our study deals with majority populations’ opinions concerning the welfare
entitlements of immigrants, we focus on native respondents: respondents not born in
their country of residence and respondents who have at least one parent who was not born
in their country of birth and residence are excluded from the analyses.
Furthermore, due to lack of data suitable for measuring public opinions on the three
deservingness criteria depicted in Figure 1, we are – just like Larsen (2006: 74–77) –
compelled by necessity to test our hypotheses merely by means of data on the regime
dimensions that according to the institutional theory on welfare attitudes inform opinions
on deservingness.
Country-Level Variables
Selectivity is measured by means of the coverage of welfare services – i.e. the share of the
population covered by these services – provided by Scruggs’s (2004) well-known and
widely used Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset. Its mean regime scores are as
expected: liberal (25.90), conservative (28.53), social-democratic (35.48). Country scores
have been inverted so that the variable indicates selectivity instead of universality.4
We measure inequality in two ways. For measuring inequality I we use the Gini
coefficient of each country in the year 2007/2008 (United Nations Development
Program 2007). A higher Gini coefficient indicates a wider income gap, and mean regime
scores are ranked as expected: (1) liberal (35.95), (2) conservative (31.33), (3) social-
democratic (26.66). Inequality II is measured by means of the 80/20 ratio, which indicates
the ratio between the income share of the top 20 per cent and the bottom 20 per cent of the
income distribution for each country (Eurostat s.d.a). Higher scores on this variable also
indicate more inequality, and mean regime scores are also ranked in accordance to our
expectations: (1) liberal (5.00), (2) conservative (4.40), (3) social-democratic (3.72).
Unemployment is used to indicate a general lack of job opportunities at the bottom of
the labor market. It is measured as the unemployment level in each country in the year
2008 (Eurostat, s.d.b). Higher scores stand for higher unemployment levels, and thus
fewer job opportunities at the bottom of the labor market, indicating that there are fewer
possibilities for sustaining oneself instead of relying on welfare. As predicted by Larsen
(2006), the highest level of unemployment can indeed be found in the conservative
regimes (mean score 7.36), as unemployment levels in liberal (mean score 5.95) and
social-democratic ones (mean score 4.24) are lower.
For each country, strictness of employment protection is measured as the degree of
employment protection along
21 basic items which can be classified in three main areas: (I) protection of regular
workers against individual dismissal; (II) regulation of temporary forms of
Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? 7
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employment; and (III) specific requirements for collective dismissals. The informa-
tion refers to employment protection provided through legislation and as a result of
enforcement processes. (OECD, s.d.).5
A higher score indicates that employment protection is stricter, and average regime scores
are in line with our expectations: (1) conservative (2.79), (2) social-democratic (1.82), (3)
liberal (0.50).
To properly test the empirical validity of the institutional theory outlined above, there is
need to control for the primary competing theory: that of ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina and
Glaeser 2004). Roughly put, this theory holds that there is less support for economic
redistribution in liberal welfare regimes because their more ethnically heterogeneous char-
acter undermines the social solidarity that underlies this support. Hence, we will control for
the share of non-western immigrants in each country (Schneider 2008) in the analyses that
follow (cf. Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Manevska and Achterberg 2011). The underlying idea
is that this variable indicates the share of immigrants in the population that are (perceived to
be) culturally different and (perceived to) have different values and are consequently
(perceived to be) a cultural threat to the native population (cf. Schneider 2008: 58). The
mean regime scores are, however, not ranked in accordance to what is generally expected,
as liberal welfare regimes have the lowest, instead of highest, share of non-western
immigrants: (1) conservative (6.72), (2) social-democratic (5.55), (3) liberal (4.23).
Ethnic diversity of immigrants is the second indicator that will be used in order to
control for ethnic heterogeneity theory. It is constructed by calculating the Herfindahl
index of immigrant respondents in all four waves of the European Social Survey since
2002. In each of these waves the respondents reported their country of birth, which made
it possible to measure the diversity of the immigrant population within each country.
Ethnic diversity of immigrants indicates the mean scores of the Herfindahl indices that
were calculated for these countries for each ESS wave. It ranges from 0 (perfectly
ethnically homogeneous immigrant population) through 1 (perfectly ethnically heteroge-
neous immigrant population). As such, higher scores indicate higher levels of ethnic
diversity within the immigrant population of a country. The mean regime scores of this
indicator for ethnic heterogeneity theory are ranked as expected: (1) liberal (0.17), (2)
conservative (0.16), (3) social-democratic (0.13).6
Individual-Level Variables
The dependent variable welfare chauvinism is measured by means of the following
question: “Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when
do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens
already living here?” This is the best available measure for an international comparison of
welfare chauvinism as conceptualized here. Unsurprisingly, the only other internationally
comparative studies on welfare chauvinism we know of also utilize this question (Mewes
and Mau 2012; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2012). Its answer categories are (1)
“Immediately on arrival”, (2) “After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they
have worked”, (3) “Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year”, (4)
“Once they have become a [country] citizen”, (5) “They should never get the same
rights”. Please note that the wording of both the question and its answer categories
indicates that this item does not focus on the desirability of welfare benefits and services
8 J. van der Waal et al.
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in general. Instead, the item’s “specific wording … assesses Europeans’ support for
welfare chauvinism quite well” (Mewes and Mau 2012: 130).7
Unfortunately, higher scores do not validly indicate a stronger reluctance towards
entitling immigrants to welfare services. There is no problem with answer categories 1,
2, 3 and 5: when placed in this specific order, higher scores stand for more welfare
chauvinism. Category 4, however, does not fit into this pattern: it addresses the legal status
of immigrants – citizens versus non-citizens – which is substantially different.
Furthermore, the conditions that need to be met in order to gain citizenship vary widely
among European countries, which severely hampers international comparability of this
answer category (cf. Mewes and Mau 2012: 130–131). Therefore, we have left answer
category 4 out of our measurement of welfare chauvinism: we have recoded categories 1
to 3 and 5 into 1 to 3 and 4 respectively. A higher score on this variable thus indicates a
stronger resistance toward entitling immigrants to welfare.
To properly test our hypotheses, we need to control for compositional effects.
Therefore, the analyses include the following individual-level indicators.
We control for level of education because it has been found numerous times that
education affects attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants (Emler and Frazer
1999). Education is measured as the minimum number of years of schooling needed to
attain the highest level of education achieved by the respondent.
Income needs to be controlled for, too, because one’s economic position affects one’s
attitudes towards economic redistribution (Van der Waal et al. 2007). The variable income
indicates respondents’ total household income, after tax and compulsory deductions. It is
measured in deciles of the actual household income range in the country in which the
respondents reside. A higher score indicates a higher income level.
As previous research demonstrates that the unemployed (Houtman et al. 2008) and
those dependent on welfare (Van der Waal et al. 2010) tend to favor economic redistribu-
tion, the analyses that follow will also control for respondents’ unemployment and welfare
dependency. For unemployment we have coded respondents who were unemployed and
looking for a job at the time of the interview as “2” and those who were not as “1”. For
welfare dependency we have coded respondents not dependent on welfare as “1” and
those who are welfare dependent as “2”.
Finally, we include the control variables female (male = 1; female = 2), because women
are generally more inclined to support welfare arrangements than men are, and age (in
years), as the elderly are more inclined to such support than the young (Koster 2010).
Results
Before assessing whether Larsen’s (2006) branch of institutional theory can account for
different levels of welfare chauvinism in different welfare regimes, we have first explored
the differences in welfare chauvinism between welfare regimes by calculating the share of
the native population stating that immigrants should never get the same rights. The results
are in accordance with our expectations: the percentage is 11.7 in liberal regimes, 9.3 in
conservative ones and 3.6 in social-democratic regimes.
Of course, this merely provides a first indication. For assessing and explaining welfare
regime differences in welfare chauvinism, ordered-logit multilevel analyses are needed,
the results of which are displayed in Table 1. Because we can use only a limited number
of countries, we will not introduce the explanatory variables all at once when testing our
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hypotheses: the relevance of each explanatory dimension will be tested separately – we
first determine whether the effect of a certain dimension is statistically significant, and if
this is the case, we test whether it is responsible for differences in welfare chauvinism
among welfare regimes. It should, however, be noted that the limited number of countries
does not rule out multilevel modeling. As Gelman and Hill (2007: 275) observe in their
authoritative work on the subject:
Advice is sometimes given that multilevel models can only be used if the number of
groups is higher than some threshold … Such advice is misguided … When sample
sizes are small (…) it should still work at least as well as classical regression.
The null model shows that there is a significant multilevel structure in the data, and
model 1 introduces the individual-level control variables. Controlling for this composition
effect, model 2 demonstrates that the differing levels of welfare chauvinism across welfare
regimes that were found above are less salient if individual-level socio-economic back-
ground characteristics are taken into account: natives in social-democratic welfare regimes
are less welfare chauvinistic than natives in liberal welfare regimes, but those in con-
servative ones are not. Hence, strictly speaking, there are two instead of three worlds of
welfare chauvinism, as shown in our adjusted baseline model (model 3), in which liberal
and conservative regimes are combined into a single reference category, so as to minimize
the number of country-level variables.
Before testing our hypotheses, we assess whether differences in ethnic heterogeneity
can explain differences in welfare chauvinism. Models 4 and 5 indicate that this is not the
case: neither of the two variables used to measure ethnic heterogeneity (share of non-
western immigrants and ethnic diversity of immigrants) has a significant effect on welfare
chauvinism, even though the latter’s regime scores are in line with ethnic heterogeneity
theory. This indicates that in testing our hypotheses, we will not find spurious effects
caused by regime differences in ethnic heterogeneity.
Model 6 addresses our first hypothesis, which holds that differences in welfare chau-
vinism can be explained by differences in the selectivity of welfare regimes. Selectivity
does, indeed, have a significant effect in the expected direction: in countries with the most
selective welfare regimes, the native population is most welfare chauvinistic.
Models 7 and 8 both address our second hypothesis, which relates to the inequality
dimension and states that differences in welfare chauvinism can be explained by differ-
ences in income inequality among welfare regimes. The analyses show that in countries
that display more income inequality, measured with either the Gini coefficient or the 80/20
ratio, natives consider immigrants to be less entitled to welfare than in countries char-
acterized by lower levels of income inequality.
Having established this, we turn to the part of the institutional theory of welfare attitudes
that deals with the labor-market trajectory. On the basis of this theory, we expect that
differences in welfare chauvinism can be explained by differences in unemployment levels
(hypothesis 3) and by differences in the strictness of employment protection (hypothesis 4).
Model 9, however, indicates that neither of those hypotheses stands the test: the effects of
unemployment and strictness of employment protection are not significant. In countries with
low levels of unemployment or unregulated employment relations, the native population
does not consider immigrants more or less entitled to welfare than in countries with high
levels of unemployment or more regulated employment relations.
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In order to determine whether selectivity and inequality not only have an effect on
welfare chauvinism, but are also responsible for the observed differences in welfare
chauvinism between the social-democratic welfare regimes on the one hand and the
liberal and conservative ones on the other, we have to conduct two additional analyses.
The first one is depicted in model 10, where the regime dummy for the social-democratic
welfare regimes and selectivity are entered simultaneously. Although the coefficient of the
regime dummy in this model is no longer significant, this cannot be attributed to the low
level of selectivity in the social-democratic regimes, as the coefficient of selectivity is not
significant either.
The low levels of inequality in those regimes can, however, explain their low levels of
welfare chauvinism. This is shown in model 11, where the effect of wage inequality, as
measured by the Gini coefficient, takes over the effect of the social-democratic regime
dummy that was found in our baseline model. Strictly speaking, the other measure of
wage inequality, the 80/20 ratio, does not yield the same result as its coefficient is not
significant at the 5 per cent level (model 12). It needs to be emphasized, however, that it is
close to being so (p = 0.057). All in all, the last three models indicate that the lower levels
of welfare chauvinism in social-democratic regimes as compared to liberal and conserva-
tive ones can be attributed to the low levels of income inequality in the former ones.
Conclusion and Discussion
Drawing on literature demonstrating that three worlds of welfare capitalism have resulted
in three worlds of public support for the poor and the unemployed (Larsen 2006, 2008),
we expected to find three worlds of welfare chauvinism. Strictly speaking, however, our
analyses indicate that there are two, instead of three, worlds of welfare chauvinism: the
native populations of liberal and conservative welfare regimes are more reluctant to entitle
immigrants to welfare than those living under social-democratic regimes. This pattern is in
line with the institutional theorizing on welfare attitudes. We therefore formulated hypoth-
eses for testing whether a specific branch of institutional theory, developed by Larsen by
combining insights from previous theorizing on the welfare state (most notably by
Marshall 1950; Titmuss 1968, 1974; Van Oorschot 2000; Myles and Quadagno 2002),
can account for it.
Not all hypotheses derived from this theory have been corroborated. First, we hypothe-
sized that welfare regimes that are most selective, that is, regimes in which welfare
services are “means-tested”, result in high levels of welfare chauvinism. Our findings
indeed point in that direction: high levels of selectivity yield high levels of welfare
chauvinism. Contrary to our expectations this cannot, however, account for the low levels
of welfare chauvinism in social-democratic regimes. This needs to be interpreted with
care, as our analysis uses a rather crude measure of selectivity (cf. Gilbert 2009).
Therefore, if suitable and more fine-grained data become available for countries that can
be categorized according to Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes, these should
be used in order to test the robustness of these results.
Second, the different labor-market trajectories brought about by the different welfare
regimes do not affect the level of welfare chauvinism at all. Neither the unemployment level
nor the strictness of employment regulation has any impact on the degree to which native
populations consider immigrants to be entitled to welfare benefits and services. These results
suggest that differences in welfare chauvinism are not related to differences in (perceptions
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of) the extent to which immigrants are considered to be in need of welfare or to the extent to
which they are considered to be in control of their own labor-market situation.
Things are different, however, when it comes to the inequality brought about by welfare
regimes. Our analyses indicate that higher levels of income inequality go hand in hand
with higher levels of welfare chauvinism. This suggests that less diverging lifestyles
between the rich and the poor lead to more understanding towards (potential) immigrant
welfare recipients among majority populations. Put differently, in more unequal societies
the rich are more likely to consider minority groups deviant, and therefore less entitled to
welfare. Importantly, this relationship between income inequality and welfare chauvinism
can account for the different levels of welfare chauvinism between welfare regimes: the
native populations in social-democratic welfare regimes consider immigrants most entitled
to welfare because of the low levels of income inequality. Thus, one of the three regime
dimensions around which the institutional theory of welfare attitudes under scrutiny
revolves can explain the existence of two worlds of welfare chauvinism.
In addition, it needs to be noted that it is very unlikely that two dominant non-institu-
tional theories on welfare attitudes can account for the existence of two worlds of welfare
chauvinism. First, we have included two measures to control for the theory of ethnic
heterogeneity (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), neither of which had any effect. This indicates
that the level of welfare chauvinism does not differ among welfare regimes because of
differences in levels of solidarity brought about by differences in ethnic heterogeneity.
Second, our findings indicate that “ethnic competition theory” (Olzak, 1992) – which
suggests that welfare chauvinism is inspired by a desire to exclude ethnic outgroups in a
competition over scarce welfare entitlements – is also an unlikely candidate for explaining
regime differences in welfare chauvinism. The high levels of welfare chauvinism in regimes
characterized by a higher level of income inequality might, at first sight, also be interpreted in
accordance with this theory, as interethnic struggle for welfare entitlements is fiercer if there is
a more pronounced economic underclass. Yet, national-level unemployment, which is a more
valid indicator for testing ethnic competition theory as it measures the need for welfare
assistance more directly, does not have a significant positive effect on welfare chauvinism.
This suggests that differences in ethnic competition are not responsible for different levels of
welfare chauvinism in different welfare regimes. This suggestion is substantiated by our
control variables at the individual level: neither unemployment nor welfare dependency has
any effect whatsoever, indicating that welfare chauvinism is not inspired by ethnic competi-
tion over scare welfare resources (cf. Van der Waal et al. 2010). In short, neither a cultural nor
an economic non-institutional theory of welfare chauvinism seems to be able to provide an
alternative explanation for the existence of two worlds of welfare chauvinism.
In addition to our findings, the explanatory value of the institutional theory on welfare
attitudes addressed warrants further scrutiny for three reasons. As these go far beyond the
scope of the present study, future research needs to bring additional insights. First, the
formulation of the commonly used dependent variable is rather broad: it deals with social
benefits and services without further specification. In line with institutional reasoning, it
can be expected that the extent to which immigrants are considered entitled depends on
the nature of the services and benefits involved. Therefore, future research could benefit
from more fine-grained measures addressing various types of welfare services and bene-
fits. Second, other policies might also affect the perceived entitlement of immigrants
among the public at large. The two most salient ones for the question at hand seem to be
multiculturalism policies, which are discussed by Banting and Kymlicka (2006), and
14 J. van der Waal et al.
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immigration regimes (cf. Sainsbury 2006). Both affect the extent to and the way in which
immigrants are institutionally incorporated and might therefore affect the welfare chau-
vinism of the native population. Third, in light of institutional theory and our findings,
remarkable differences have occurred across social-democratic welfare regimes in recent
years. Denmark practically installed a two-tier welfare system, in which immigrants have
less access to welfare benefits and services than the native population, while Sweden and
Norway did not. As Bay and colleagues (2013) demonstrated – in accordance with our
findings – this occurred while the level of welfare chauvinism among the public at large
hardly differs among those countries. They indicate that electoral competition, as well as
agenda setting and mobilization by right-wing populist parties in Denmark, are key to
understanding these differences across social-democratic regimes (Bay et al. 2013). Future
research on the impact of institutions on welfare opinions could gain from this insight:
welfare institutions that foster high levels of solidarity can go hand in hand with exclusive
policies due to political processes.
All that said, we would like to conclude with discussing the relevance of our findings in
the policy domain. Although we are not the first to demonstrate that institutions affect the
welfare opinions of the people, the insight that institutions matter in this respect is highly
salient for those who consider the existence of exclusionary sentiments as worrying in
itself. We have demonstrated that egalitarian policies and institutions can help in fighting
such sentiments. Our results indicate that strengthening policies and institutions aimed at
reducing income inequality can be utilized for that cause.
Furthermore, inspired by Alesina and Glaeser (2006), it is often assumed that the ethnic
heterogeneity stemming from immigration in Europe in recent decades undermines the
solidarity that is needed for extensive welfare states. A combination of high levels of
ethnic heterogeneity and high levels of solidarity is therefore deemed impossible. Our
findings, however, indicate that such a “progressive dilemma” (Banting 2010), is by no
means inevitable: our heterogeneity measures had no effect on welfare chauvinism
whatsoever. This is a salient finding, because one might expect that if ethnic heterogeneity
indeed hampered solidarity, the most likely type of solidarity to be negatively affected
would be solidarity towards ethnic others, such as immigrants. Our analyses, however,
indicate that this is not the case. High levels of ethnic heterogeneity and solidarity can
therefore go hand in hand, which is a vital insight for academics and policymakers alike.
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Notes
1. The concept is sometimes used differently. Crepaz and Damron (2009), for instance, label concerns over the
potential detrimental effects of immigration on the welfare state and employment opportunities of natives as
“welfare chauvinism”. Note that this is not how welfare chauvinism is conceptualized here. The sentiments
assessed by Crepaz and Damron are commonly denoted as (perceived) ethnic threat, ethnocentrism, or anti-
immigrant attitudes.
2. See note 1.
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3. While the Netherlands is considered an ambiguous welfare regime (cf. Goodin and Smitsman 2000), it should
be noted that “in terms of welfare state structures and the living conditions of potentially poor, the country
holds the most in common with the social democratic regimes” (Larsen 2007: 84, italics in original). In
response to a query made by an anonymous reviewer, we have, however, also performed the analyses with the
Netherlands categorized as a conservative regime. This also leads to a rejection of hypotheses 1, 3 and 4, and
a corroboration of hypothesis 2. The corroboration of hypothesis 2 is even somewhat more convincing, as
both inequality indicators can account for regime differences in welfare chauvinism in these analyses
(available upon request).
4. Because Scruggs’s instrument is rather crude, we also performed analyses with the selectivity measure
available through Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) (Korpi and Palme 2008). This has been
recommended by Larsen (2006: 73), who conducted his research when this data source was not yet available.
There is, however, hardly any variance on this measure, and the regime scores are not in accordance with
Larsen’s theory. It therefore does not surprise that it does not affect welfare chauvinism at all (analyses
available upon request).
5. For details, see: http://www.oecd.org/employment/protection (accessed September 30, 2010).
6. We thank Ferry Koster for generously sharing his calculations.
7. An anonymous reviewer asked whether our analyses allow disentangling welfare chauvinism and a more
general preference for fewer social benefits and services for citizens (that is, regardless of whether a citizen is
an immigrant or not). In order to control for the degree to which one desires social benefits and services in
general, we have replicated our analyses while controlling for economic egalitarianism. This does not lead to
meaningfully different results: again, hypothesis 2 is corroborated and hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 are rejected
(analyses available upon request).
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